Feminist Foreign Policies in the EU: Progress, Challenges, and Impact

In recent years, several EU member states have made headlines by explicitly adopting what they call a “Feminist Foreign Policy” (FFP). Sweden pioneered this approach in 2014 with a comprehensive framework centered on rights, representation, and resources. France followed in 2018 by rebranding its International Strategy on Gender Equality as “feminist diplomacy,” while Luxembourg announced its feminist foreign and development policy the same year. Spain joined the movement in 2020 with its Guide to Feminist Foreign Policy, which aims to align national and foreign policies to strengthen its commitment to women and girls. Most recently, Germany launched its FFP guidelines in 2021, presenting an expansive vision that emphasizes intersectionality and post-colonial awareness. Each of these initiatives represents different interpretations of what it means to conduct foreign policy through a feminist lens.

But what exactly is feminist foreign policy, and how transformative is this new approach? Moreover, as these national initiatives emerge within the context of existing EU frameworks on gender equality, a crucial question arises: how do these self-proclaimed feminist foreign policies relate to broader EU gender equality policies? Do they represent a genuine departure from, or merely a rebranding of, established EU approaches to gender equality in external action?

Understanding Feminist Foreign Policy

For feminist scholars, activists and practitioners, feminist foreign policy represents an ambitious attempt to place gender equality at the heart of a country's external relations. It aims to move beyond simply adding women to existing foreign policy frameworks, instead seeking to transform how foreign policy itself is conceived and conducted. This approach demands that all aspects of foreign policy - from trade and security to development cooperation and diplomatic relations - be examined through a gender lens. While often attributed to Sweden's 2014 initiative, the concept builds upon decades of feminist activism, research, and policymaking. It draws from landmark achievements like the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, 1979), the Beijing Platform for Action (1995), and the Women, Peace and Security agenda.

The transformative potential of FFP lies in its ability to disrupt traditional power structures in international relations by addressing systemic inequalities. As articulated by the International Centre for Research on Women, FFP calls for a policy approach that prioritizes peace, gender equality and environmental integrity; promotes human rights; actively seeks to disrupt colonial, racist, and patriarchal power structures; and allocates significant resources to achieve these goals.

National Approaches: Evolution and Diversity

Looking at FFP frameworks across EU member states reveals both commonalities and significant differences in approach. Early adopters like Sweden and France focused primarily on women and girls, employing what scholars call a "gender binary" approach. Sweden's policy was structured around three Rs: Rights, Representation, and Resources, while France emphasized protecting women's rights and combating gender-based violence.

More recent frameworks, particularly from Germany and Spain, demonstrate a more explicit intersectional approach. They explicitly acknowledge that gender inequality intersects with other forms of discrimination based on factors like race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, and economic status. Germany's guidelines, for instance, go beyond the gender binary and specifically include LGBTQI+ rights, while Spain's framework emphasizes tackling multiple forms of discrimination simultaneously. In terms of economic empowerment, we observe predominantly liberal, market-based approaches across all frameworks. These policies heavily emphasize women's entrepreneurship, labor market participation, and corporate partnerships.

Implementation strategies and resource allocation also vary significantly across countries. While all frameworks emphasize institutional commitment to gender equality, they adopt different approaches to gender budgeting and institutional structures. Spain, for example, has established an Ambassador for Feminist Foreign Policy and created a high-level advisory group to guide implementation, while Germany has integrated its FFP commitments into existing institutional structures. Germany's FFP also includes specific targets for gender-responsive project funding, pledging that by 2025, 85 percent of its aid funding will support projects with gender equality as a secondary goal, and at least 8 percent will go to projects with gender equality as their primary goal. However, the substance behind these commitments requires careful scrutiny, as countries often differ in how they define and measure gender-responsive projects.

Gender Equality and Intersectionality in the EU External Action

Despite the alleged novelty of the approach presented by FFPs, the European Union has a long-established tradition of applying a gender perspective in its foreign policy. While references to the integration of gender in development cooperation appear as early as 1995, the Programme of Action for the mainstreaming of gender equality in Community Development Co-operation (2001) went a step further by establishing gender mainstreaming as a “guiding principle” in the European Commission’s development cooperation policy. Already these documents went beyond the particular situation of women by focusing on the “effects policies and measures have on the situations of both sexes.” In 2005, the European Consensus on Development, signed by the presidents of the Commission, Parliament, and the Council, recognized gender equality as one of the five common principles of EU development cooperation.

In 2010, four years before Sweden announced its FFP, the EU adopted its first Action Plan on Gender Equality and Women Empowerment in Development (2010-2015), later known as GAP I. This operational document proposed a series of activities to be carried out by the European Commission as well as by the EU Member States. Among these, it envisioned that the G-marker (the Gender Equality Policy Marker of the OECD) would be applied for at least 80% of all EU projects. This action plan was followed, in 2015, by GAP II, titled Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment: Transforming the Lives of Girls and Women through EU External Relations 2016-2020. Unlike GAP I (and Sweden’s FFP), the new action plan announced that “the intersection of gender with other social inequalities” would inform the EU approach, albeit it failed to elaborate on how this intersectional perspective would be reflected in the operational framework. By 2020, the target was to attain 85% of new programs scoring G1 (gender equality as significant objective) or G2 (gender equality as principal objective).

The most recent EU Gender Action Plan (GAP III), issued in 2020, adopts an explicitly intersectional approach with a focus on the “most disadvantaged women,” including those from indigenous populations or belonging to racial/ethnic/religious minorities, forcibly displaced, migrant, economically and socially deprived women, those living in rural and coastal areas, etc. Moreover, it retains its commitment to reach at least 85% of all new external actions scoring G1 or G2 by 2025. While this goal still remains a distant one, the EU has steadily improved its share from around 58% in 2016 to 65% in 2019.

Challenges and Contradictions

Despite their ambitious rhetoric, it isn’t clear to what extent FFPs go beyond the vision and goals already laid out in the EU GAPs. In this regard, the explicit adoption of the 'feminist' label in foreign policy raises interesting questions about intended audiences and strategic messaging. Is it aimed at domestic constituencies, EU partners, or the global community? The timing is particularly noteworthy, coming amid growing anti-gender movements and backlash against feminism worldwide. One could argue that the 'feminist' designation might serve as a branding exercise, allowing countries to distinguish themselves as progressive actors on the international stage. However, this raises concerns about whether the label might be more about signaling virtuous intentions than achieving structural transformation.

In addition, feminist foreign policies face several implementation challenges and contradictions. One glaring example is the tension between feminist principles and arms exports. Sweden, despite its pioneering FFP, remained one of the world's largest arms exporters, including to countries with poor women's rights records. Similarly, Germany's feminist foreign policy guidelines, while calling for arms control and disarmament, don't prioritize reducing the country's position as the world's fifth-largest arms exporter.

Moreover, the sustainability of feminist foreign policies remains uncertain. Sweden's recent shift away from its FFP following a change in government highlights how these policies often depend on specific political parties or leaders. This raises questions about the institutional embedding of feminist principles in foreign policy bureaucracies. Spain's framework explicitly acknowledges this challenge, emphasizing the need for proper institutionalization within foreign service structures to ensure continuity beyond individual governments or ministers.

The real test of feminist foreign policies will lie not in their ambitious frameworks or progressive language, but in their practical implementation and ability to effect genuine structural change. As these policies continue to evolve, close attention must be paid to whether they can move beyond liberal, market-based approaches to address deeper systemic inequalities in the international order.