Venezuela's electoral impasse exposes the fragility of global and regional institutions to guarantee democracy and human rights

The election result in Venezuela wasn't exactly a surprise. Announced on the 29th of July by the National Electoral Council, the day after the elections, it showed the current president Nicolás Maduro as the winner, with around 51% of the vote. The trajectory of the last few months has made it clear that the government is not willing to respect one of the basic principles of the democratic regime: the logic of the circulation of ruling elites. Nevertheless, the result has created a politically complex situation with implications on a global scale, for the region, and specifically for Brazil.

With the disqualification of María Corina Machado, a former member of parliament for the First Justice (Primero Justicia) Party, the leadership of the opposition was assumed by career diplomat Edmundo González Urrutia, a member of the Democratic Unity Roundtable (Mesa de la Unidade Democrática) coalition. Despite his less political profile, he was considered the frontrunner until the exit polls. 

The manner in which the election results were announced, disregarding established protocols, and, most notably, the government's response to legitimate inquiries, confirmed existing fears. The presidential inauguration is scheduled for January 10th 2025, but the opposition has not yet accepted the results and has made copies of the records available, claiming they provide evidence of fraud. 

The dispute centres around the election results, with the records becoming a symbol of this contention. Street protests have already resulted in deaths and arrests. Maduro has accused María Corina and Edmundo González of hacking the electoral system and has stated that they must surrender to the authorities. The Venezuelan state's repressive machinery, which moves more swiftly than international negotiation processes and pressure, combined with an opposition that has shown itself to be both mobilised and representative, suggests a turbulent path ahead. 

The outcome of the Venezuelan elections is part of a long process of democratic fragility, which has marked not only domestic but also regional politics. Political polarisation, especially after the election of Hugo Chavez in 1999, has been at the heart of bilateral and multilateral relations in Latin America and the Caribbean, with a major impact on regional cooperation and integration projects.

Mechanisms for promoting and protecting democracy - such as electoral commissions and democracy clauses - and for mediating and resolving conflicts have been eroded and lost their legitimacy. There are no institutionalised mechanisms for dealing with political crises in the region today. Ad hoc initiatives, such as the Agreement for the Promotion of Political Rights and Electoral Guarantees and for the Guarantee of the Vital Interests of the Nation, signed on 17 October 2023 in Barbados, referred to as the Barbados Agreement, have been ineffective.

Political polarisation is a global phenomenon. Although the rise of the far right is the most recent phenomenon, Venezuela is an exemplary case of left-wing authoritarianism, where the discourse of inclusion has increasingly become mere rhetoric over the years. The emancipatory elements of the Chavista project are outweighed by these repressive and authoritarian practices. Elections are often a formal procedure maintained by governments just to legitimise their stay in power.

The international reaction to the elections shows how the crisis has taken on global proportions in the current context of hegemonic disputes and intensified geopolitical conflicts. The US and the European Union have not recognised the result and are demanding that the electoral minutes be presented, based on the opinion of the Carter Center electoral observation commission and, more recently, the preliminary report of the UN Panel of Experts, published on 14 August.

On the other hand, China, Russia and Iran immediately recognised Maduro's victory, indicating a dispute on definitions. Some analysts point to a North/South divide, others to a split between democratic and authoritarian countries, and still others to a division between the spheres of influence of China and the United States.

In the Latin American and Caribbean region, the political-ideological divide prevails: Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Honduras recognise Maduro's victory, while Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica, among others, point to fraud. Brazil, Colombia and Mexico are trying to mediate the situation collectively. Alicia Barcena, the former Secretary General of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), is seeking mediation with the US. Colombia is particularly affected by flows of migrants and refugees, as well as Maduro's relations with paramilitary groups.

For Lula's government in Brazil, to whom regaining regional leadership is a foreign policy objective, the challenge is enormous, as disagreement on Venezuela permeates the domestic coalition built to defeat Bolsonaro. The situation is even more complex given Lula´s Labour Party (PT) recognition of Maduro's victory. Even so, Brazilian diplomacy (and Celso Amorim in particular) is investing heavily in finding a negotiated solution, trying to avoid the escalation of violence and repression, as well as concerns about the Maduro government's territorial expansion project in the Guyanese region of Essequibo.

The crisis that has arisen is, on the one hand, an expression of the fragility of global and regional institutions to deal with issues on the democratic and human rights agenda; on the other, it is impacted by the absence of these mechanisms. In countless cases over the last few decades, international institutions have been able to contribute to situations where the legitimacy of domestic institutions was weak or non-existent. Extensive electoral monitoring is a clear example of this. Human rights norms are a central pillar that can limit the use of violence.

The reconstruction of robust regional institutions, such as the Union of South American Nations (Unasur) or the African Union (AU), with agendas that have a real impact on social life and that allow for the generation of minimum consensus for international action, is clearly necessary today. In this manner, the region could continue on its path of contributing to global governance and, at the same time, prevent Latin America from being engulfed by the systemic dispute between the United States and its allies and China and its allies.

 

This article was originally published in Portuguese at The Conversation on August 16, 2024, at 4:30 pm CEST. You can find the original version here.

It was authored by Monica Herz, Full Professor, and Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann, Associate Professor, both from the Institute of International Relations at Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio)

The opinions expressed in this blog are solely those of the author and do not reflect the views of EU-VALUES Network.

Previous
Previous

Unpacking China's Influence on Global Human Rights Norms

Next
Next

The paradoxes of a value-based EU foreign policy